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Abstract - This paper aims to assess the effect of sharing the CFA franc on bilateral trade 
in the African Franc Zone (AFZ) since 1995. In the light of the endogenous theory of optimum 
currency, we estimate an augmented gravity model with the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Like-
lihood estimator, and obtain two major results: (i) the effect of CFA on the bilateral trade of 
the African Franc Zone member countries is positive, but different in the two zones, because 
of the specific characteristics of the countries; (ii) based on three modeled scenarios ("Ag-
gregation", "Cooperation" and "Consolidation"), the results finally show that the two zones 
would all win if they merged to form a consolidated monetary union, which would tend to 
justify the ongoing reforms. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The single currency and bilateral trade nexus is founded in the endogeneous the-
ory of optimal currency area (OCA). This theory opposes two main theses. On the 
one hand, the thesis of the vicious circle of OCA, which states that the transition to a 
single currency increases the specialization of countries according to their compar-
ative advantages, which tends to make asynchronous cycles and to amplify the 
asymmetry of shocks (Krugman, 1993). On the other hand, the thesis of the virtuous 
circle of OCA, which shows that the single currency is a factor of business cycles syn-
chronization (Frankel & Rose, 1998), an economic growth factor (Vickers, 2000), 
and a channel of market integration (Rose, 2000). This article aims at testing 
whether the CFA Franc has stimulated trade between the member countries of the 
African Franc Zone (AFZ). 
Created in 1939 by France in its former colonies, the Franc Zone can be pre-
sented as one of the oldest monetary zones in the world. It is made up of France, the 
Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CAEMC) member countries 
(Cameroon, Congo, Central African Republic, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Chad), 
the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) member countries (Be-
nin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Niger, Mali, Senegal and Togo) and 
the Islamic Union of the Comoros. These countries and groups of countries use their 
respective currencies, namely the Euro for France, the African Financial Cooperation 
Franc for the CAEMC member countries, the African Financial Community Franc for 
the WAEMU member countries, and the Comorian Franc for the Comoros. The need 
to study the effect of the CFA franc on trade in the countries of the African Franc 
zone can be justified by the fact that this monetary zone is one of the oldest in the 
world. In addition, its member countries are engaged in other economic integration 
projects, in particular the African Union project. From this perspective, it becomes 
appropriate to evaluate one of the macroeconomic effects in terms of the commer-
cial benefit of sharing this currency. 
Empirically, the authorship of the work on the link between the single currency 
and market integration goes back to Rose (2000). In his analysis, he shows that 
countries that share the same currency trade on average three times more than the 
countries that have kept their individual currencies. His second result suggests that 
reducing exchange rate volatility - even at zero - does not lead to the same effects on 
trade as the adoption of the same currency. 
In Africa, little attention has been paid to the link between the single currency 
and bilateral trade. Studies on the subject followed two ways. The first way focusses 
on existing monetary unions (in particular the AFZ). The results show that the Afri-
can Franc Zone is not an optimal monetary zone, based on a static or exogenous 
analysis, but tends to validate its optimality according to the endogenous approach 
(Sampawende Tapsoba, 2007, 2009; Zhao & Kim, 2009). Recent work confirm glob-
ally the existence of the endogenous effects of a single currency (Couharde, Cou-
libaly, Guerreiro & Mignon, 2013; Coulibaly & Gnimassoun, 2013; Harvey & Cushing, 
2015; Grekou, 2016). The second way focusses on the feasibility of potential cur-
rency unions in Africa. Most of the results lead to an optimistic consensus that en-
dogenous mechanisms may be triggered over time to make the sharing of a single 
currency beneficial (Buigut & Valev, 2005; Houssa, 2008; Tsangarides & Qureshi, 
2008).  
The Franc Zone is a privileged field for the experimentation of these debates. 
However, we do not pretend to explore in this article all of them. It therefore seemed 
necessary to start by examining the nature of the relationship between the long-
term monetary experience of member countries and their trade performance with 
each other and with their main partners. Thus, the main objective of this paper is to 
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check whether the use of the CFA franc has been a factor of market integration in 
the CAEMC and the WAEMU. In other words, it aims at identifying the trade gains 
that the CFA francs would have generated in these two communities. More specifi-
cally, it is necessary to estimate the multiplier effect of sharing the CFA franc on the 
bilateral trade of the African Franc zone member countries and to simulate the same 
effect under three scenarios, in particular the «Aggregation scenario», the «Cooper-
ation scenario» and the «Consolidation scenario». 
The contribution of this paper lies on three levels. Firstly, it raises the question 
of the commercial integration of the Franc Zone in a context of monetary reforms, 
that of the WAEMU which must switch from June 2020 to a new currency area (the 
ECO zone), and that of the CAEMC currently in full harmonization of its tariff instru-
ments with ECCAS with a view to projecting towards a single currency. Second, it 
addresses the monetary integration debate of the African franc zone through the 
prism of trade costs / gains, with a view to assessing the opportunity cost endured 
by the members’ countries due to the absence of monetary reforms. Finally, we 
adopt some specifications of the variable of interest (sharing of the same currency) 
that we consider as reforms (scenarios) and we examine their potential effects on 
trade. For this, we adopt from the status quo, three scenarios, namely “Aggregation”, “Cooperation” and “Consolidation”. 
Our empirical analyses highlights two key findings: (i) the effect of CFA on the bilat-
eral trade of the African Franc Zone member countries is positive, but different in the two 
zones, because of the specific characteristics of the countries; (ii) based on three modeled 
scenarios ("Aggregation", "Cooperation" and "Consolidation"), the results finally show that 
the two zones would all win if they merged to form a consolidated monetary union. 
Following this introduction, the rest of the paper is organized into four additional 
sections. Section 2 presents a brief literature review. Section 3 highlights the empir-
ical strategy. Section 4 analyzes the main findings and addresses their robustness. 
Section 5 presents some concluding remarks. 
2. SELECTED RECENT LITERATURE REVIEW 
Recent works on the link between monetary union and trade tends to show that, 
while remaining positive, this link has differentiated and (a)symmetrical effects, but 
also dynamic and dimensional effects. 
2.1. Differentiated and (a)symmetric effects 
Questioning the direct effect of currency unions on market integration, Sadeh 
(2014) assesses the impact of the euro on the bilateral trade of the European Union 
member countries. He manages to show that because of the euro, the Mediterranean 
European States benefited more in trade compared to others. In addition, the euro 
would have increased the trade of European non-euro area countries by 35%. For 
Camarero, Gómez and Tamarit (2014), while the effect of the euro on trade has been 
greater than that of exchange rate coordination, they note, however, that when these 
variables are controlled in the model, the residual effect of the euro certainly re-
mains positive and significant, but decreases quite significantly. For Glick and Rose 
(2016), the effect of the entry or exit of a monetary structure is symmetrical. They 
manage to demonstrate that the introduction of the euro has increased the bilateral 
trade of member countries by about 50%. Finally, by showing that different mone-
tary unions produce different effects on bilateral trade, Glick and Rose (2016) pro-
vide an empirical solution to the generally encountered aggregation bias of the grav-
ity model specifications. This approach inspires our empirical strategy when we de-
velop several scenarios for the African franc zone. 
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2.2. Dynamic and dimensional effects 
Since Rose (2000), there has been little work on the dynamic effects of currency 
unions on trade. They were interested in the nature of the link between the two var-
iables, without addressing the question of the dynamics of this link over time. On the 
basis of this observation, Katayama and Melatos (2011) using the panel dataset con-
structed by Glick and Rose (2002) that covers 217 countries from 1948 to 1997, 
demonstrate the non-linear impact of the single currency on bilateral trade. Thus, 
they show that, contrary to previous studies, the sharing of a single currency does 
not influence the level of bilateral trade in the same proportion. After him, de Sousa (2012)’s study, based on a theoretical gravity model covering a large period (1948 
to 2009) proves that the effect of sharing a single currency on bilateral trade is erod-
ing over time, because of the existence of the other channels that are commercial 
and financial globalization. 
This result remain robust and cherish by Miron, Miclaus and Vamvu (2013). The 
authors restate the result of Rose (2000) on the differentiated effects of the sharing 
of a single currency and the reduction of volatility of the exchange rate. Moreover, 
they confirm the hypothesis of the continuous declining effect of currency union on 
bilateral trade. According to Larch, Warner and Yotov (2018), the monetary union 
effects on trade are dimensional. Using a structural gravity model, the authors dis-
tinguish in the case of euro zone, bilateral and multilateral effects. They discover 
that both effects are positive and statistically significant. Globally, this set of results 
remain consistent with that previously established by Bergin and Lin (2012), using 
a different methodology 
3. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
3.1. The model 
In this paper, we use the gravity model, which continues to be cited as a reference 
in international economics. This model experienced three essential historical evolu-
tions in its formalization, namely the era of zero trade flows in the mid-1990s, the 
era of multilateral resistances popularized in the early years 2000, and the resur-
gence of a new literature that integrates the heterogeneity of firms in the late 2000s. 
Despite the existence of other competing methods, this model continues to emerge 
as a robust tool for modeling trade flows (Gervais, 2019; Baier, Yotov &  Zylkin, 
2019; Agnosteva, Anderson & Yotov, 2019; Santana-Gallego & Pérez-Rodríguez, 
2019). The gravity model is based on the postulate of Newtonian physics, according 
to which the force of attraction between two bodies is proportional to the product 
of their relative masses and inversely proportional to the square of the distance sep-
arating them. The gravity model was first transposed into economics by Tinbergen 
(1962). But it is Anderson (1979) and then Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) who 
introduced the debate related to its theoretical foundations.  
There are several specifications of the gravity equation. But in this paper we 
adopt the structural specification of Head and Mayer (2014) that puts interest on 
multilateral resistance terms: 
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𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝑌𝑖𝑎Ω𝑖 𝑌𝑗𝑏Φ𝑗 𝜙𝑖𝑗  (1) 
Where 𝑌𝑖 = ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑗  is the production of country 𝑖, 𝑌𝑗 = ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑖  is the global expense 
of the importer 𝑗. Ω𝑖  and Φ𝑗 , the multilateral resistance terms1, are included to avoid the “Gold medal error” (Baldwin & Taglioni, 2007). The literature generally relies on 
two measurement approaches. The first measure of multilateral resistance is what 
is technically called "Remoteness". The second approach recommends the use of 
fixed effects. In this paper, we use the Helliwell multilateral proxies (because they 
take into account the economic size of the countries), which we modify subsequently 
by giving them a bilateral dimension. Theses proxies are given in (2): 
𝑅𝑀1𝑖𝑛 = ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑖 𝑌𝑖                     𝑅𝑀2𝑖𝑛 = [ ∑ 𝑌𝑖𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗]−1 (2) 
The two measures seem to be biased. The first gives particular importance to 
multilateral resistances in small countries because it grows exponentially when 𝑌𝑖 →0. The second tends to minimize multilateral resistance in small countries. Further-
more, due to the fact that our dependent variable is bilateral, we tried to give the 
bilateral measure of theses proxies as: 𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑗 = [ 𝑌𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗]−1 (3) 
The other empirical debate in the gravity equation is how to model the distance. 
Should the distance be international, intra-national or both? Generally, the measure 
adopted for international distance is that of an orthodromic distance between the 
two capitals of countries 𝑖 and 𝑗. However, this measure is criticized, as the transport 
of goods does not follow a rectilinear trajectory. In this context, it is important, in 
order to reduce the potential related bias, to integrate intra-national distance. Fol-
lowing Wei (1996) and Wolf (1997), we adopt the measure given by Helliwell 
(1998), noted as the root square of the country area. 
After integrating the resistance and the distance terms, our augmented and log-
linearized gravity model can be noted as follows:   𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑌𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑌𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑗𝑡)+ 𝛽5𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖) + 𝛽7𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑗)+ 𝛽8𝐶𝐹𝐴𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽9𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽10𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽11𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽12𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽13𝑅𝑀𝑖(𝑛)(𝑗)+ 𝜇𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
 
(4) 
In this specification, 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the bilateral exports from country 𝑖 to country 𝑗, 𝑌𝑖(𝑗) 
the nominal GDP of country 𝑖(𝑗), 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖(𝑗) the population of country 𝑖(𝑗) and 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗  the 
bilateral distance between countries 𝑖 and 𝑗. 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖(𝑗) captures the intra-na-
tional distance of county 𝑖(𝑗), measured as the square root of the area of the country. 
                                                                    
1 According to Head and Mayer (2013), Φ𝑗 = ∑ 𝜙𝑗𝑙𝑌𝑙Ω𝑙𝑙  and  Ω𝑖 = ∑ 𝜙𝑙𝑖𝑌𝑙Φ𝑙𝑙 . 
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Among the dummy variables, 𝐶𝐹𝐴𝑖𝑗  is the variable for sharing the single currency, 
taking the value 1 if countries 𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 j belong to the same zone, and 0 otherwise, and 
it is the variable of interest in this paper. It is used in three different specifications, 
one for CAEMC, one for WAEMU and the last one for the two zones taken together. 𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑗  is the variable indicating the simultaneous openness of partners, equal to 1 if 
countries 𝑖 and 𝑗 are simultaneously open to the sea and 0 if not. 𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑗  is equal to 1 if 
countries 𝑖 and 𝑗 share the same official language, and 0 otherwise. 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑗  is a dyadic 
which takes the value 1 if countries 𝑖 and 𝑗 have been colonized by the same metrop-
olis. The variable 𝑅𝑀𝑖(𝑛)(𝑗) captures the bilateral resistances (𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑗) and multilateral 
resistances (𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑛). Finally, 𝜇𝑖𝑗  is the bilateral fixed effect and 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a random per-
turbation; 𝑖 the individual dimension (country) and 𝑡 the temporal dimension. 
3.2. Brief survey on estimation techniques  
The estimation of gravity models faces several technical problems. As docu-
mented by Kabir, Salim and Al-Mawali (2017), these problems are related to (i) het-
eroscedasticity, heterogeneity and autocorrelation (Kabir, 2009), (ii) the manage-
ment of zero trade value (Helpman Melitz & Rubinstein , 2008; Felbermayr Gabriel 
& Wilhelm, 2006; Harris Kónya  & Mátyás, 2012; Magee, 2008; Westerlund & Wil-
helmsson, 2009), (iii)  the nature (fixed or random) of specific effects (Egger, 2002; 
Baier & Bergstrand, 2007), (iv) the presence of cross-sectional dependence (Brei-
tung and Pesaran, 2008; Harris Kónya  & Mátyás, 2012), (v) endogeneity and the 
double-hurdle (Harris Kónya & Mátyás, 2012), (vi) multicollinearity and identifica-
tion (Cheong et al., 2015). 
The debate on the gravity model literature revolves around the management of 
the problem of zero flows of the dependent variable, resulting in a loss of infor-
mation. Indeed, taking the logarithm of trade flows in the presence of zero values, 
the matrix of these flows will be reduced to the positive values. To overcome this 
problem, the literature proposes approaches based on log-linear models (truncated 
OLS regression, panel fixed effects model, panel random effects model, Feasible Gen-
eralised Least Square Estimator – FGLS –, Eaton and Kortum – EK – Tobit Model) and those based on multiplicative models’ estimators (Generalized linear models –
GLM) such as the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) Estimator and the 
Multinomial PPML. 
However, the inability of log-linear specifications to efficiently handle the zero-
value problem has shifted interest to non-linear specifications. For this purpose, 
Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006) propose a strategy to overcome the inconsistency 
occurring when the model is estimated by OLS using the log-linear functional form, 
in the presence of heterokedasticity and null trade flows. When the matrix of trade 
flows is sparse, the hypothesis of a log-normal error terms distribution of the log-
linear model is violated. Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006) recommend the use of 
the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator. 
To do this, model (4) becomes non-linear and specified as 
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  𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 = Exp {𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑌𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑌𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑗𝑡)     +𝛽5𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖) + 𝛽7𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑗)       +𝛽8𝐶𝐹𝐴𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽9𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽10𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽11𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽12𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽13𝑅𝑀𝑖(𝑛)(𝑗) } + 𝜇𝑖𝑗+ 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
 
(5) 
3.3. Variables, sample and data source 
The variables used in this paper are of two types, namely quantitative and 
dummy variables. A detailed presentation is given in appendix 1. The sample covers 
the CAEMC and WAEMU members countries (reporters countries), supplemented 
by their partners, grouped within the African sub-regions (ECOWAS, ECCAS, SADC, 
CAE, AMU) and other regions of the world (EU, ASEAN, MERCOSUR and NAFTA), for 
a total of 95 countries (see appendix 2). The period of study selected is 1995-2014, 
in order to guaranty a balanced sample according to the dependent variable, which 
is the total bilateral exports. We exclude Guinea-Bissau from the WAEMU group due 
to data unavailability on several variables, notably the dependent variable. The data 
are extracted from three main bases: the UNCTAD database for bilateral exports, the 
World Bank database (World Development Indicators) for quantitative variables and 
the CEPII base for distances. 
4. RESULTS AND ROBUSTNESS 
4.1. Results 
Taking the sub-region specifications, the finding of the main variable of interest 
of this article (𝐶𝐹𝐴𝑖𝑗) seems to confirm the intuition. Indeed, the use of the CFA franc 
in the CAEMC and WAEMU seems to have fostered commercial integration in the 
two sub-regions. However, this effect is different. Specifically, the results show that 
bilateral trade would have increased (according to all specifications), on average by 
55.44% in the CAEMC and by 38.56% in the WAEMU. This effect, which is significant 
at 1%, also hides a reality, namely a small proportion of intra-sub-regional trade 
flows in these two regions. Indeed, recent statistics show that intra-regional trade 
has not exceeded 2% for the CAEMC and 10% for the WAEMU (see Table 1). It is 
therefore a consistent increase, even if based on very small quantities. 
The results of bilateral and multilateral resistances are globally negative in the 
CAEMC and positive in the WAEMU. This difference suggests the existence of variant 
and invariant factors, but not taken into account by the standard gravity model, 
which depress trade in the CAEMC, but tends to intensify it in the WAEMU. Indeed, 
this finding should not always be surprising, because the gravity equation fails to 
model factors such as political agreements and other factors related to bilateral 
partnerships agreements. 
Moreover, the results generally remain in line with the theoretical predictions 
for the traditional variables, namely GDP, populations and distance, except in the 
WAEMU where the GDP of country 𝑖 is negatively correlated with bilateral trade. 
This paradoxical result, observed whatever the specification, could be explained by 
the fact that any increase in production in this sub-region is not in favor of trade. 
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This result may be meaningful, given that most WAEMU member countries are spe-
cialized in the services and food products, because they do not have natural resource 
endowments and a fairly rich subsoil.  
Table 1: Separated PPML results in CAEMC and WAEMU. 
 Dependent variable: bilateral exports 
CAEMC   WAEMU 
[1] [2] [3] [4]   [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Log(Yi) 0.1551*** 0.0794*** 0.1372*** 0.1583***   -0.077*** -0.067*** -0.075*** -0.079*** 
 (15.68) (5.51) (11.29) (16.05)   (3.56) (2.87) (3.39) (3.67) 
           
Log(Yj) 0.2126*** 0.2132*** 0.2143*** 0.2180***   0.1267*** 0.1269*** 0.1271*** 0.1245*** 
 (96.69) (96.76) (96.97) (92.02)   (70.85) (70.94) (71.00) (66.15) 
           
Log(Popi) -0.709*** -0.502*** -0.665*** -0.778***   0.3076*** 0.3227*** 0.3160*** 0.2995*** 
 (14.70) (8.90) (12.77) (16.16)   (4.85) (5.02) (4.97) (4.70) 
           
Log(Popj) 0.0462*** 0.0458*** 0.0479*** 0.1442***   0.0711*** 0.0694*** 0.0686*** 0.1269*** 
 (16.15) (15.98) (16.67) (34.07)   (30.53) (29.52) (29.13) (40.96) 
           
Log(Distij) -0.262*** -0.262*** -0.244*** -0.259***   -0.312*** -0.329*** -0.336*** -0.267*** 
 (56.94) (54.89) (47.59) (46.40)   (83.35) (68.87) (65.69) (62.51) 
           
XAFij 0.4419*** 0.4418*** 0.4446*** 0.4363***       
 (30.00) (29.98) (30.10) (23.23)       
XOFij       0.3913*** 0.3874*** 0.3854*** 0.1404*** 
       (37.80) (37.36) (37.14) (12.07) 
           
RM1in  -0.002***  -0.001***    -0.0007  0.0006 
  (5.12)  (3.71)    (0.63)  (0.47) 
           
RM2in   -7.305***      6.3083***  
   (7.32)      (3.81)  
           
RMij  -0.0087 -0.0348**     0.2218*** 0.0495  
  (0.48) (2.50)     (5.52) (0.87)  
           
Log(D_intrai)    1.5200***      -0.0691 
    (3.26)      (0.64) 
           
Log(D_Intraj)    -0.201***      -0.118*** 
    (36.27)      (29.25) 
           
Opij    0.1648***      0.1824*** 
    (14.34)      (17.94) 
           
CLij    0.1214***      0.0771*** 
    (11.82)      (7.55) 
           
CBij    0.0592***      0.1052*** 
    (2.84)      (8.50) 
           
CCij    0.4589***      0.3580*** 
    (34.50)      (30.06) 
           
Constant 5.8138*** 4.2573*** 5.3292*** -3.7502   -2.671*** -3.008*** -2.669*** -2.739*** 
 (8.70) (6.37) (7.89) (1.29)   (4.60) (4.38) (4.39) (3.51) 
           
Observations  11 238 11 238 11 238 11 238   13 111 13 111 13 111 13 111 
           𝜇𝑖𝑗 Yes  No No Yes   Yes  No No Yes 
Pairs  1 900 1 900 1 900 1 900   1 900 1 900 1 900 1 900 
           
Alpha 0.6752 0.4326 0.6072 0.3761   0.0413 0.0414 0.0439 0.0205 
           
lnalpha_cons -0.3927 -0.8378 -0.4988 -0.9777*   -3.186*** -3.182*** -3.125*** -3.884*** 
 (0.74) (1.50) (0.92) (1.77)   (5.93) (5.92) (5.83) (7.24) 
           
LR test 𝛼 = 0 
Pro>=chibar2 
5 081.07 
[0.0000] 
5 000.18 
[0.0000] 
4 694.04 
[0.0000] 
2 035.27 
[0.0000] 
   2 203.05 
[0.0000] 
1 854.25 
[0.0000] 
1866.27 
[0.0000] 
1 250.14  
[0.0000] 
           
Wald chi2 
Prob > chi2 
24242.56 
[0.0000] 
24259.09 
[0.0000] 
24219.72 
[0.0000] 
27315.85 
[0.0000] 
  21144.26 
[0.0000] 
21258.24 
[0.0000] 
21275.95 
[0.0000] 
24113.60 
[0.0000] 
z-stats in parentheses               * p<0.10 ; ** p<0.05 ; *** p<0.01 
Source: Author 
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In this context, any increase in production would be marginal and oriented to-
wards local consumption. By adopting an income perspective in country 𝑗, it appears 
that if income increases in this country, this gives an additional purchasing power 
to the country, capable of increasing its domestic and foreign demand. However, the 
effect could be mitigated in country 𝑖 since not all production is necessarily destined 
for export. There must be surpluses. 
We estimate also the same equation for the two areas taken together. In this 
specification, we assume three scenarios: “Cooperation”, “Aggregation” and “Consol-
idation”. In the first scenario (“Cooperation”), we include the single currencies as two dif-
ferent variables (XAF for CAEMU and XOF for WAEMU) in the same model. The two 
currencies coexist, but each zone retains its privileges: we are close to the theoreti-
cal status quo, since it is postulated that the effects of the CFA would be different. 
Some operating principles of the Franc Zone could be revisited. For example, it is 
possible to decide to pool foreign exchange reserves and create a common account 
of operations, but multilateral surveillance remains confined to the each zone. It is a 
non-voluntary integration scheme that is limited to the minimum. Here, we estimate 
a single model for both Communities, with XAF and XOF being treated as two sepa-
rate but juxtaposed variables (see Eq. 6): 
  𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝐸𝑥𝑝 { 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑌𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑌𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑗𝑡)+𝛽5𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖) + 𝛽7𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑗)   +𝛽8𝑋𝐴𝐹𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽9𝑋𝑂𝐹𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽10𝑅𝑀𝑖(𝑛)(𝑗) + 𝜃𝐷𝑖𝑗                                        } + 𝜇𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
 
(6) 𝐷𝑖𝑗  is the vector for dummy variables and 𝜃 the vector of their coefficients. In the second scenario (“Aggregation”), we assume the aggregation of the single 
currencies into a single variable. Both CFAs are supposed to have the same effect, 
but each zone keeps its currency. This is the hypothesis of the superposition or in-
difference of CFA in CAEMU and WAEMU. The two central banks coexist. This sce-
nario is based on the psychology of actors and citizens, especially with regard to the 
belief that they have in both currencies, even if the institutional mechanisms are 
slow to adjust. Here, the populations and the economic operators apprehend the 
CFAs indifferently, which is quite the opposite of the institutional ones who are not 
compatible with necessary reforms. We estimate a single model for both Communi-
ties, XAF and XOF being stacked as one variable: 
  𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝐸𝑥𝑝 { 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑌𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑌𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑗𝑡)+𝛽5𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖) + 𝛽7𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑗)   +𝛽8𝑋𝐴𝐹𝑋𝑂𝐹𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽9𝑅𝑀𝑖(𝑛)(𝑗) + 𝜃𝐷𝑖𝑗                                                      } + 𝜇𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
 
(7) The third scenario (“Consolidation”) postulates the transition to an enlarged and 
consolidated monetary union for both. Here we postulate the fusion of the two com-
munities. The XAF and the XOF merge to become one and the same currency (called 
CFA) circulating in all 14 countries of the AFZ. Gradually, CAEMU and WAEMU merge 
to create a new entity governed by new principles. The single currency is managed 
by a new Central Bank (BEAC and BCEAO merge) and foreign exchange reserves are 
further consolidated. Under this scenario, cooperation in the ZFA becomes total. 
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Both zones reinvent themselves, but choose the internal opening. This is a more op-
timistic scenario than that of cooperation or aggregation. In the estimated model, 
the CFA variable is reconstructed assuming that the two zones form a single cur-
rency union. 𝐶𝐹𝐴𝑖𝑗 = 1 if the country pair (i, j) belongs to the AFZ. This scenario is 
modelled as (see Eq. 8): 
Table 2: PPML estimator Results for the two zones under three scenarios. 
 Dependent variable: bilateral exports 
Cooperation scenario  Aggregation scenario  Consolidation scenario 
[9] [10]  [11] [12]  [13] [14] 
Log(Yi) 0.0207* 0.0706***  0.0207* 0.0704***  0.0191* 0.0721*** 
 (1.86) (7.27)  (1.86) (7.26)  (1.71) (7.46) 
         
Log(Yj) 0.1645*** 0.1642***  0.1646*** 0.1643***  0.1707*** 0.1704*** 
 (112.34) (112.11)  (112.69) (112.46)  (115.54) (115.28) 
         
Log(Popi) -0.1599*** -0.2650***  -0.1599*** -0.2646***  -0.1747*** -0.2865*** 
 (4.59) (8.03)  (4.59) (8.02)  (5.01) (8.71) 
         
Log(Popj) 0.1250*** 0.1267***  0.1245*** 0.1263***  0.1239*** 0.1258*** 
 (49.86) (50.27)  (50.46) (50.90)  (50.14) (50.62) 
         
Log(Distij) -0.2482*** -0.2373***  -0.2480*** -0.2372***  -0.2299*** -0.2183*** 
 (68.54) (58.37)  (68.55) (58.37)  (62.05) (52.52) 
         
XAFij (cooperation) 0.2546*** 0.2524***       
 (17.32) (17.17)       
         
XOFij (cooperation) 0.2371*** 0.2374***       
 (21.87) (21.88)       
         
XAFij and XOFij (aggregation)    0.2426*** 0.2421***    
    (25.34) (25.27)    
         
CFAij (consolidation)       0.3075*** 0.3067*** 
       (39.55) (39.42) 
         
RM1ij -0.0022***   -0.0022***   -0.0023***  
 (7.71)   (7.69)   (8.08)  
         
RM2ij  -1.2910*   -1.2852*   -1.4340** 
  (1.67)   (1.66)   (1.86) 
         
RMij 0.0086 -0.0665***  0.0081 -0.0668***  0.0150 -0.0623*** 
 (0.53) (5.07)  (0.50) (5.09)  (0.93) (4.77) 
         
Log(D_intrai) 0.2373 0.3179*  0.2374 0.3178*  0.2525 0.3364* 
 (1.49) (1.65)  (1.49) (1.66)  (1.53) (1.67) 
         
Log(D_Intraj) -0.141*** -0.142***  -0.140*** -0.141***  -0.143*** -0.145*** 
 (43.27) (43.57)  (43.70) (44.03)  (44.83) (45.18) 
         
Opij 0.1823*** 0.1832***  0.1825*** 0.1833***  0.1909*** 0.1918*** 
 (24.08) (24.20)  (24.11) (24.23)  (25.24) (25.35) 
         
CLij 0.0882*** 0.0881***  0.0890*** 0.0888***  0.0660*** 0.0658*** 
 (12.29) (12.28)  (12.47) (12.45)  (9.18) (9.16) 
         
CBj 0.1288*** 0.1389***  0.1304*** 0.1402***  0.1926*** 0.2029*** 
 (12.07) (12.89)  (12.33) (13.12)  (19.71) (20.52) 
         
CCij 0.4022*** 0.4017***  0.4002*** 0.4000***  0.3511*** 0.3510*** 
 (46.51) (46.46)  (47.39) (47.38)  (40.96) (40.95) 
         
Constant -0.5810 -0.6573  -0.5826 -0.6591  -0.6982 -0.7625 
 (0.58) (0.54)  (0.58) (0.54)  (0.66) (0.59) 
Observations  24 349 24 349  24 349 24 349  24 349 24 349 
         
Pairs  1 900 1 900  1 900 1 900  1 900 1 900 
         
Alpha 0.0835 0.1216  0.0833 0.1212  0.0902 0.1331 
         
lnalpha_cons -2.481*** -2.106***  -2.485*** -2.109***  -2.404*** -2.016*** 
 (6.05) (5.25)  (6.05) (5.26)  (5.88) (5.05) 
         
LR test 𝛼 = 0 
Prob>=chibar2 
3 698.28 
[0.0000] 
3 641.33 
[0.0000] 
 3 703.88 
[0.0000] 
3 648.06 
[0.0000] 
 3 798.33 
[0.0000] 
3 745.22 
[0.0000] 
         
Wald chi2 
Prob > chi2 
49 210.79 
[0.0000] 
49 124.32 
[0.0000] 
 49 224.18 
[0.0000] 
49 135.70 
[0.0000] 
 49 575.29 
[0.0000] 
49 491.55 
[0.0000] 
z-stats in parentheses               * p<0.10 ; ** p<0.05 ; *** p<0.01 
Source: Author. 
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  𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝐸𝑥𝑝 { 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑌𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑌𝑗𝑡) + 𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑗𝑡)+𝛽5𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗) + 𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖) + 𝛽7𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑗)   +𝛽8𝐶𝐹𝐴𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽9𝑅𝑀𝑖(𝑛)(𝑗) + 𝜃𝐷𝑖𝑗                                                               } + 𝜇𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
 
(8) 
The results of these different scenarios reported in Table 2 show that treating 
CAEMC and WAEMU as a consolidated monetary union is beneficial for both. Indeed, 
the multiplier effect on trade would be positive, from 26.77% to 27.42%. 
4.2. Robustness checks 
In order to validate our results, we test the robustness of the estimated coeffi-
cients, in particular that associated to our main variable of interest, namely the shar-
ing of a single currency. To do this, we re-estimate our gravity model by using four 
competing estimators to PPML: (i) the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator, be-
cause of the near similarity of its first order conditions with those of the PPML com-
bined to the absence of heteroskedasticity assumption (Head & Mayer, 2014); (ii) 
the GAMMA-PML estimator, accounting for the fact that the conditional variance 
could be a function of higher power of the conditional mean (Santos Silva & Ten-
reyro, 2006; Head & Mayer, 2014); (iii) the Zero-Inflated Poisson (ZIP)  estimator, 
for the control of a possible bias relative to the high proportion of zero in the de-
pendent variable (De Benedictis & Taglioni, 2011). More specially, ZIP is used when 
the dependent variable is non-negative count data. It is a model that simulates the 
number of occurrences of an event and is suitable when the number of observed 
zero values exceeds the number of zeros predicted by the other methods (Burger, 
Van Oort & Linders, 2009); (iv) the Negative Binomial (NEGBIN) estimator, for the 
control of a possible bias related to the "over-dispersion" (the PPML requires the “equi-dispersion” property) of the dependent variable (De Benedictis & Taglioni, 
2011). NEGBIN is used for non-negative count data. Here, the count variable is gen-
erated by a "pseudo" Poisson's distribution, provided that its variance is greater 
than that of the "true" Poisson's law. We speak of over-dispersion 
The results of this robustness test (Table 3) show that the effect of the variables 
of interest retains the same sign; a positive and significant effect at 1% of sharing a 
common currency on bilateral trade. However, this effect appears to be overesti-
mated by the OLS specification and underestimated by the GAMMA specification. 
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Table 3: Robustness checks. 
Dependent variable: bilateral exports  
 CAEMC  WAEMU  CAEMU + WAEMU 
 OLS GAMMA ZIP NEGBIN  OLS GAMMA ZIP NEGBIN  OLS GAMMA ZIP NEGBIN 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑌𝑖) 1.1504*** 0.0551*** 0.0567*** 0.2213***  2.6512*** 0.1003*** 0.1215*** 0.3212***  1.1851*** 0.0598*** 0.0625*** 0.1711*** 
 (23.81) (23.88) (21.99) (22.44)  (29.54) (24.35) (30.10) (24.02)  (30.57) (36.62) (33.06) (25.94) 
               𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑌𝑗) 1.6572*** 0.0470*** 0.0569*** 0.2251***  1.1649*** 0.0311*** 0.0383*** 0.1351***  1.5073*** 0.0400*** 0.0492*** 0.1953*** 
 (48.85) (31.09) (32.84) (35.55)  (46.23) (27.44) (33.80) (34.80)  (74.43) (42.21) (49.65) (52.96) 
               𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖) 0.5886*** -0.0143*** 0.0032 0.0856***  -2.3382*** -0.0775*** -0.106*** -0.3177***  0.7889*** -0.0079*** 0.0080*** 0.1254*** 
 (11.80) (7.35) (1.24) (9.15)  (12.77) (9.92) (13.15) (11.61)  (19.92) (4.59) (3.76) (18.54) 
               𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑗) 0.4321*** 0.0121*** 0.0252*** 0.1016***  0.7474*** 0.0191*** 0.0261*** 0.1017***  0.5178*** 0.0159*** 0.0238*** 0.0803*** 
 (10.02) (5.93) (10.95) (12.05)  (21.35) (12.88) (16.16) (18.23)  (18.82) (13.06) (17.47) (16.89) 
               𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗) -2.1973*** -0.0478*** -0.074*** -0.0001***  -3.2309*** -0.0648*** -0.092*** -0.3964***  -2.5352*** -0.0675*** -0.089*** -0.3666*** 
 (16.98) (11.86) (15.18) (21.17)  (48.72) (25.36) (34.78) (35.87)  (36.62) (32.19) (34.43) (37.39) 
               𝐶𝐹𝐴_𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑀𝐶 3.0863*** 0.1192*** 0.1660*** 0.6060***           
 (10.05) (14.72) (16.28) (17.46)           
               𝐶𝐹𝐴_𝑊𝐴𝐸𝑀𝑈      3.9804*** 0.1432*** 0.1755*** 0.3743***      
      (25.06) (26.97) (29.74) (19.56)      
               𝐶𝐹𝐴_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛           3.7598*** 0.0939*** 0.1196*** 0.4690*** 
           (29.59) (22.16) (23.10) (28.03) 
               
Constant -55.1802*** 0.6861*** 0.0339 -10.972***  -25.069*** 1.1304*** 0.9620*** -1.4769***  -53.882*** 0.7579*** 0.1742*** -6.7512*** 
 (40.26) (10.30) (0.49) (38.47)  (13.09) (17.95) (12.63) (5.50)  (56.24) (17.20) (3.76) (37.31) 
Observations 11 238 6 965 11 238 11 238  13 111 9 653 13 111 13 111  24 349 16 618 24 349 24 349 
               
Pairs  1 900 1 900 1 900 1 900  1 900 1 900 1 900 1 900  1 900 1 900 1 900 1 900 
               
R2 0.4133     0.4072     0.4059    
               
Fisher 
Prob > F 
2 046.70 
[0.0000] 
    2 087.22 
[0.0000] 
    3 952.77 
[0.0000] 
4 733.71 
[0.0000] 
  
               
Wald chi2 
Prob > chi2 
 2 903.42 
[0.0000] 
3 910.28 
[0.0000] 
2 825.06 
[0.0000] 
  2 607.41 
[0.0000] 
6 259.61 
[0.0000] 
3 359.92 
[0.0000] 
   8 096.12 
[0.0000] 
6 054.43 
[0.0000] 
Note : * p<0,10 ; ** p<0,05 ; *** p<0,01 
Source : Author. 
 
13 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The objective of this article was to evaluate the CFA franc effect on market inte-
gration in the African Franc Zone member countries. To achieve this, we used a grav-
ity model according to the latest developments of Head and Mayer (2014), aug-
mented with bilateral (and multilateral) resistances to address the gold medal error, 
a dummy variable capturing the sharing of a single currency and several other con-
trol variables. Following a series of empirical manipulations using the PPML estima-
tor as the main technique, we obtain the following key findings: (i) the effect of CFA on 
the bilateral trade of the African Franc Zone member countries is positive, but different in the 
two zones, because of the specific characteristics of the countries; (ii) based on three modeled 
scenarios ("Aggregation", "Cooperation" and "Consolidation"), the results finally show that 
the two zones would all win if they merged to form a consolidated monetary union, which 
would tend to justify the ongoing reforms.  
In the light of these results, it seems appropriate for the authorities to reflect 
deeply on the reform of the African franc zone which could restore the role of the 
shared currency as a real instrument of macroeconomic adjustment. These reforms 
could move towards the consolidation of the two zones into a single monetary union 
or towards the opening of the member countries to the regional economic commu-
nities established by the African Union strategy, as actually in WEAMU with the ECO. 
This paper could thus presented as a relevant empirical basis which can shed 
light on the decision of WAEMU countries to switch from the CFA Franc to the ECO, 
just as it can be used as a reference to guide the rational that would currently be 
carried out in the CEMAC area. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1: Description of the variables used. 
Variable Description Source 
Groups 
CAEMC WAEMU 
CAEMC  
+ 
WAEMU 
Mean 
(obs.) 
Std-dev. 
Mean 
(obs.) 
Std-dev. 
Mean 
(obs.) 
Std-dev. 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 Dependent variable that measures 
bilateral exports from country i to 
country j. 
UN CTAD 
(2016) 
8.3091  
(11 400) 
7.1392 
9.9905 
(13 300) 
6.6581 
9.2145 
(24 700) 
6.9350 𝑌𝑖𝑡 Nominal GDP of country i, ie the re-
porter country. 
World 
Bank 
(WDI)  
22.3180  
(11 400) 
1.1542 
22.4009  
(13 300) 
0.7871 
22.3626 
(24 700) 
0.9747 𝑌𝑗𝑡 Nominal GDP of country j, ie the 
partner country or country of desti-
nation. 
24.2100  
(11 238) 
2.4167 
24.2114  
(13 111) 
2.4181 
24.2108 
(24 349) 
2.4174 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 Population of country i, that is, the 
reporter country. 
15.0864  
(11 400) 
1.1417 
16.2167  
(13 300) 
0.3990 
15.6950 
(24 700) 
1.0024 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑗𝑡 Population of country j, ie partner 
country. 
16.1515  
(11 400) 
1.1417 
16.0911  
(13 300) 
1.7395 
16.1190 
(24 700) 
1.7233 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗  Distance between country i and 
country j. It is measured in kilome-
ters. 
CEPII 
8.3034 
(11 400) 
0.7631 
8.3127  
(13 300) 
0.7980 
8.3084 
(24 700) 
0.7821 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖  Intra-national distance of country i, 
measured as the logarithm of the 
square root of the area of the coun-
try. 
Author, us-
ing World 
Bank 
(WDI)  
6.3301  
(11 400) 
0.5948 
6.2911  
(13 300) 
0.5334 
6.3091 
(24 700) 
0.5629 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑗  Intra-national distance of country j, 
measured as the logarithm of the 
square root of the area of the coun-
try. 
6.0368  
(11 400) 
1.0502 
6.0420  
(13 300) 
1.0453 
6.0396 
(24 700) 
1.0475 𝑅𝑀1𝑖𝑛 Multilateral resistance according to 
Helliwel first specification (1998) : 𝑅𝑀1𝑖𝑛 = ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑖 𝑌𝑖  0.0002  (11 400) 0.0003 0.0001 (13 300) 0.0001 0.0002 (24 700) 0.0003 𝑅𝑀2𝑖𝑛 Multilateral resistance according to 
Helliwel second specification 
(1998) : 𝑅𝑀2𝑖𝑛 = [ ∑ 𝑌𝑖𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗]−1 
5.48e-08  
(11 400) 
7.22e-08 
5.18e-08  
(13 300) 
4.93e-08 
5.32e-08 
(24 700) 
6.10e-08 
𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑗 Bilateral resistance between coun-
try i and any country j. It is measured 
as the report 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗/𝑃𝐼𝐵𝑖. 2.20e-06  (11 400) 5.04e-06 1.28e-06  (13 300) 1.36e-06 1.70e-06 (24 700) 3.59e-06 𝑀𝑈𝑖𝑗  Simulated dummy variable for shar-
ing a single currency between coun-
try i and country j. 
Author, us-
ing Google 
Earth data 
// // // // // // 𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑗 , 𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑗 , 𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑗, 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑗  Dummy variable of the simultaneous opening to the sea, sharing of a com-mon land border, sharing a common 
language, sharing a common colizer 
in the past 
// // // // // // 
Source: Author.  
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Appendix 2 : The sample. 
ECCAS ECOWAS 
SADC without 
Angola, RDC 
and Tanzanie 
UMA 
+ Egypt 
EAC with-
out Bu-
rundi 
EU of 28 ASEAN + Japon + China + South Corea MERCOSUR NAFTA 
Angola Benin* Botswana Algeria Kenya Austria Brunei Darussalam Argentina Canada 
Burundi Burkina Faso* Lesotho Libya Rwanda Belgium Cambodge Brasil Mexico 
Cameroon* Cape Verde Madagascar Mauritania Uganda Bulgaria China Paraguay United States 
Centrafrique* Côte d'Ivoire* Malawi Morocco Tanzania Croatia Indonésia Uruguay  
Chad* Gambia Mauricius Tunisia  Cyprus Japon Venezuela  
Congo* Ghana Mozambique Egypt  Czech republic Corea, Republique of   
DR Congo Guinea Namibia   Denmark Dem. Rep. of Lao   
Equatorial Guinea * Guinea-Bissau Seychelles   Estonia Malaisia   
Gabon* Liberia South Africa   Finlande Myanmar   
Sao Tomé-and-Principe Mali* Swaziland   France Philippines   
 Niger* Zambia   Germany  Singapour   
 Nigeria Zimbabwe   Greece Thaïlande   
 Senegal*    Hungary Viet Nam   
 Sierra Leone    Irland    
 Togo*    Italy    
     Lettonia    
     Lituania    
     Luxembourg    
     Malte    
     Netherland     
     Poland    
     Portugal    
     Roumania    
     Slovakia    
     Slovenia    
     Spain     
     Sweden    
     United Kingdom    
Note : * = CAEMC and WAEMU countries (reporters countries) 
Source: Author. 
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L’effet du Franc CFA sur le commerce 
 
Résumé - L’objectif de cet article est d’évaluer, à la lumière de la thèse endogène des zones 
monétaires optimales, l’effet du partage du franc CFA par les pays de la Zone Franc africaine 
sur leur commerce bilatéral depuis 1995. L’évaluation est faite à partir d’un modèle de gravité 
augmenté estimé selon la méthode du Pseudo-Maximum de Vraisemblance. Au terme des ana-
lyses, nous parvenons à deux principaux résultats : (i) premièrement, l’effet du franc CFA sur 
le commerce bilatéral des pays de la Zone Franc africaine est positif, mais différent selon les 
zones, à cause des caractéristiques des pays ; (ii), sur la base de trois scénarii modélisés 
(« Agrégation », « Coopération » et « Consolidation »), les résultats montrent enfin que les deux 
zones gagneraient toutes si elles fusionnaient pour former une union monétaire consolidée, ce 
qui tendrait à justifier les réformes en cours. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Mots-Clés 
Zone Franc africaine 
Franc CFA 
Commerce bilatéral 
Modèle de gravité 
 
  
 
 
 
